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had to verify the data inserted by the typists. The controllers' wage was 50% 
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the typists than direct appointment. 
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1 Introduction
Among psychologists a broad consensus exists that not only expected outcomes shape
human behavior, but also the way in which decisions are taken. A persistent finding
is that people behave very differently in outcomewise-identical situations depending on
the decision making procedures which led to these outcomes [e.g. Thibaut and Walker
(1975), Lind and Tyler (1988), Collie et al. (2002), Anderson and Otto (2003) and Blader
and Tyler (2003)]. Workplace relations is a prominent example of an economic context
in which procedures have been found to play an eminent role. Reactions to promotion
decisions, bonus allocations, dismissals etc. strongly depend on the perceived fairness of
selection procedures [e.g. Lemons and Jones (2001), Konovsky (2000), Bies and Tyler
(1993), Lind et al. (2000) and Roberts and Markel (2001)]. In this literature it is argued
that procedures matter because they affect the beliefs that people hold about each others’
intentions and expectations which subsequently influence their behavior.
But not only psychologists have found evidence for procedural concerns. There is also
evidence from experimental economics which indicates that people are not only concerned
about the consequences of decisions, but also care about the decision-making procedures
involved [Blount (1995), Falk et al (2000), Bolton et al. (2005), Charness (2004), Brandts
et al. (2006), Charness and Levine (2007)]. Brandts et al. (2006), for example, show
that selection procedures matter in a three-player game in which one player has to select
one of the other players to perform a specific task.1 They find that the selected players
behave very differently in their subsequent tasks depending on the procedure which was
used to select them.
Traditionally, economic theory assumes that agents only care about the consequences
of decisions. Although consequentialism allows that agents care about the payoffs of
other players, e.g. that they are altruistic or envious, it inherently implies that people
behave the same in outcomewise identical situations, regardless of the decision-making
procedures that led to these situations. Thus, consequentialism is at odds with the afore-
mentioned evidence that people are (also) concerned about the way in which decisions
are taken. To get an intuition for why consequentialism fails when procedures mat-
ter, consider the following principal-agent relation: Suppose there is a profit-maximizing
principal that has to assign two equally skilled agents to two different jobs. The first
job (‘controller’) is paid better than the second (‘typist’), with no difference in difficulty.
For simplicity, let’s only concentrate on the disadvantaged, i.e. the typist, and his effort
choice. Assume the principal first chooses the procedure by which the typist is chosen.
He has three different strategies: (i) He can directly appoint agent 1; (ii) he can directly
appoint agent 2; (iii) he can choose a random appointment procedure giving both agents
an equal chance to get either job. After the tasks are allocated, the appointed typist
1Two different treatments are studied which differ with regard to the selection procedure. In both
treatments the task of the selected player is to choose between the same two payoff allocations deter-
mining the payoffs of all three players.
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chooses his effort. Note that the principal basically has two appointment procedures
that he can choose between. He can either decide himself by using strategies (i) and (ii)
or he can let chance decide by using strategy (iii). These appointment procedures differ
with regard to the ex-ante probabilities that they attach to specific outcomes. The proce-
dure implied by strategies (i) and (ii) puts probability 1 on one of the agents. Procedure
(iii), on the other hand, puts the ex-ante probability 0.5 on each of the agents. Clearly,
the typist’s effort choice should be independent of the principal’s selection procedure, if
the typist is only concerned about final outcomes. His effort choice should be the same
irrespective of the selection procedure, as the feasible final payoff allocations are the same
independent of how the typist was chosen.
In contrast to this, however, the aforementioned behavioral evidence from psychol-
ogy and experimental economics suggests that the typist’s effort choice depends on the
selection procedure even though the feasible final payoff allocations are independent of
how he was chosen. More precisely, the typist’s effort choice should be higher when the
principal uses the unbiased random assignment procedure (i.e. strategy (iii)). In line
with this behavioral evidence Sebald (2009) suggests that ‘procedural concerns’ can be
conceptualized by assuming that people have belief-dependent reciprocal preferences a` la
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). In the principal-agent context the argument runs
as follows: Imagine that agents are not only concerned about final outcomes, but also
care about the kindness and unkindness of the principal towards them. The typist’s per-
ception about the principal’s (un)kindness towards him depends on the procedure that
the principal uses to take his appointment decision. If the principal decides to choose
the typist directly (i.e. strategies (i) or (ii)), the chosen agent interprets the principal’s
decision as intentionally directed against him. If, on the other hand, the principal de-
cides to use a random appointment procedure (i.e. strategy (iii)), the agent interprets
the outcome as pure chance rather than an intentional act of the principal. The chosen
agent interprets the principal’s choice of the random appointment procedure as ‘kinder’
and subsequently exerts higher effort compared to the situation in which he is directly
chosen to be the typist.
Our principal-agent setting and Sebald (2009)’s argument highlight two important
aspects of procedures and procedural concerns. First, procedures can be viewed as pos-
sibly stochastic decision-making mechanisms determining the ex-ante probabilities for
situations in which agents can find themselves in ex-post. Second, procedural concerns
mean that these ex-ante probabilities have an impact on agents’ decisions even ex-post,
i.e. after the resolution of the uncertainty inherent in decision-making procedures. Fol-
lowing this intuition, agents that exhibit procedural concerns are not consequentialist,
for them ‘bygones are not bygones’.
It has been shown that, in order to model such a non-consequentialist behavior,
one has to introduce belief-dependent utilities, i.e. one has to use the concepts of psy-
chological game theory [see Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009)]. Following Sebald (2009), we intuitively explained procedural concerns using
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reciprocity concerns in the example above [see Rabin (1992) and Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004)]. But reciprocity is just one possible belief-dependent concern. Other types
of belief-dependent emotions (e.g. regret, disappointment, guilt) have already been for-
malized using psychological game theory. For example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
as well as Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) look at the interaction of agents that are
guilt averse. Ruﬄe (1999) presents a psychological game-theoretic model in which sur-
prise, disappointment and embarrassment arise in the interaction of emotional agents.
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) present a general framework for dynamic psychological
games encompassing all different types of belief-dependent preferences.
These papers develop models featuring different belief-dependent preferences and in-
vestigate their impact on strategic interactions. However, none of them deals with the role
of procedural choices. In contrast, this paper concentrates on procedures, i.e. stochas-
tic decision-making mechanisms, and the impact of procedural choices on the strategic
interaction of agents that are (also) motivated by belief-dependent preferences. More pre-
cisely, this paper integrates stochastic decision-making procedures into a general model of
belief-dependent preferences, and thus provides a framework which allows for the analysis
of strategic situations in which people
(i) are motivated by belief-dependent preferences and
(ii) can choose between possibly stochastic decision-making mechanism.
Our general framework is based on the theory of dynamic psychological games by
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). Unlike their model, we allow for moves of chance in
order to allow for procedural concerns.2 Crucially, our general framework shows that
procedural concerns are not only an artifact of reciprocal preferences as suggested by
Sebald (2009), but that belief-dependent preferences in general (e.g. guilt, regret and
disappointment) might imply procedural concerns. Using our framework we formalize the
principal-agent example sketched above and derive a hypothesis concerning the impact
of the principal’s procedural choice on the typist’s effort decision.
In addition to our general theoretical framework, the paper’s second key contribution
is the test of our theory in a field experiment. To the best of our knowledge, the evidence
for procedural concerns have not been yet found in a field-experimental setting. Our
experimental findings thus have the advantage that they are established in the setting
where the subjects operated in their natural environment, that they did not know that
they participated in an experiment, and that their effort choices were real (and not
abstract numbers). We hired undergraduate students as research assistants for an ongoing
data-building project. The task of one set of subjects was typing in data, while that of
another set was verifying the data inserted by the typists. The controllers’ wage was
2Without reference to procedural concerns Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) already suggest (pp
26-28) that their framework might also be extended to allow for moves of chance.
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50% higher than that of the typists. The experiment had two treatments. In the first
treatment, we allocated subjects to jobs directly, whereas in the second treatment, the
allocation was explicitly randomized.
Our findings support the theoretical hypothesis derived on the basis of our principal-
agent setting. Furthermore, we establish a novel result concerning gender differences in
procedural concerns. Under random allocation, male typists exerted significantly higher
effort than under direct appointment, both in terms of quantity and quality. Female
typists, on the other hand, exerted higher effort only in terms of quality. These findings
relate to and complement the existing literature on gender differences in social preferences
(see Croson and Gneezy 2009).
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section the basic setup
with belief-dependent utilities and procedures is described. In section 3 we extend the
concept of sequential psychological equilibria to our framework, and prove its existence.
We present a formal version of the principal-agent setting sketched above and derive
hypotheses regarding the impact of the principal’s procedural choices in section 4. In
section 5 we describe the field experiment and report its results. In section 6 we conclude.
2 Belief-Dependent Utilities and Procedures
In this section we define the class of extensive form games with belief-dependent pay-
offs and moves of chance that we use to model procedural concerns. As said before,
belief-dependent incentives are necessary to formalize concerns like reciprocity and guilt
aversion, while moves of chance are needed to model procedures.
Let the set of players be N = {0, 1, ..., N} where 0 denotes the uninterested player
chance. Denote as H the finite set of histories h, with the empty sequence h0 ∈ H, and
Z the set of end-nodes. Histories h ∈ H are sequences that describe the choices that
players have made on the path to history h. At each non-terminal history each player
i ∈ N disposes a nonempty, finite sets of feasible actions Ai (h). After each non-terminal
history h ∈ H\Z every player i ∈ N\{0} chooses an action ai(h) from Ai (h). Player
0 ”chooses” an action a0(h) from A0 (h) according to a commonly known and verifiable
probability distribution ω(h) defined on A0 (h) with full support. Note Ai (h) can be a
singleton, meaning that player i is inactive at history h. Therefore, our framework with
moves of chance also allows for games with perfect information.
Let Ai be the finite set of pure strategies of players i ∈ N\{0} and ω the single
verifiable behavioral strategy of player 0. Pure strategies of players i ∈ N are denoted
by ai = (ai(h))h∈H\Z . Note that we use pure strategies of player 0 just for notational
purposes. Each of them just constitutes the sequence of realizations of the commonly
known behavioral strategy ω = (ω(h))h∈H\Z .
To formalize belief-dependent payoffs we assume that players hold
(i) beliefs about the strategies of other players,
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(ii) beliefs about the beliefs of other players,
(iii) beliefs about the beliefs about the beliefs of other players etc,
i.e. we assume that players have an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, and we
(iv) let them update their beliefs as events unfold.
In order to formally capture assumptions (i)-(iv), we have to define an epistemic
structure (collectively coherent hierarchies of beliefs) which describes what people initially
belief and how they update their beliefs as play unfolds. This epistemic structure can
be characterized in the context of our class of extensive form games by assuming that
players hold hierarchies of conditional beliefs over the strategies as well as beliefs of other
players i ∈ N\{0}.
We only summarize the theory of hierarchies of conditional beliefs.3 We describe,
first, a system of conditional first-order beliefs and, second, show how this extends to
higher-orders (i.e. second-order beliefs etc). Denote by A−i the set of pure strategies
combinations of all the opponents j with j ∈ N\{0, i}. At the beginning of any game,
i.e. at the initial history h0, player i 6= 0 does not know the true strategies of his oppo-
nents. He only learns the true strategy a−i ∈ A−i step-by-step by updating his beliefs
as the game unfolds. More formally, player i assigns probabilities to the events in the
Borrel sigma algebra B of A−i according to some probability measure. Let ∆ (A−i) be
the set of all such probability measures. Denote C ⊆ B the set of potential conditioning
events at which player i can update his beliefs. In other words, C is the set of poten-
tially observable events. Player i holds probabilistic beliefs about his opponents’s pure
strategies conditional on each event F ∈ C. These probabilistic beliefs are captured in a
conditional probability system (cps).
Following Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) consider the following definition:
Definition 1 A conditional probability system (cps) is a function µ (·|·) : B×X → [0, 1]
defined on (X,B, C) such that for all E ∈ B and F ′, F ∈ C:
1. µ (·|·) ∈ ∆ (X),
2. µ (F |F ) = 1,
3. E ⊆ F ′ ⊆ F implies µ (E|F ) = µ (E|F ′)µ (F ′|F ),
where X is a set, e.g. A−i, whose ‘true’ element x ∈ X is initially unknown and only
learned step-by-step as conditioning events, e.g. F ∈ C, are reached.
3For topological details, proofs and further references see Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) and Bat-
tigalli and Siniscalchi (1999).
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First order beliefs mean that X = A−i. The first two conditions of definition 1
ensure that µ (·|F ) is indeed a probability measure (i.e. µ (·|F ) ∈ ∆ (X)) which puts all
probability weight on F given that F is observed. Condition 3 ensures that players update
their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The set of all functions µ for which conditions 1-3
hold is denoted by ∆H (X). Hence, ∆H (A−i) is the set of all conditional probability
systems of order 1 of player i.
Definition 1 can easily be extended to higher-order beliefs. In the construction of the
first-order cps we start from an initial situation in which player i does not know the true
pure strategy of his opponents. He has a conditional first-order belief over it which is
updated as play unfolds. Analog to this, in the construction of a second-order belief we
start from an initial situation in which player i does not know the true pure strategy
and the true conditional first-order belief of players −i. Hence, the relevant set X in
definition 1 becomes:
X = A−i ×
∏
j 6=i
∆H (A−j) ,
where i, j ∈ N\{0} and ∆H (A−j) is the set of conditional first-order cps of player j. The
resulting conditional probability system does not only represent player i’s belief about
the strategy of players −i, but also about their first-order beliefs.
Generalizing this idea, first- and higher-order cps are defined recursively as follows.
Let:
X0−i = A−i, where i ∈ N\{0} ,
Xk−i = X
k−1
−i ×
∏
j 6=i
∆H
(
Xk−1−j
)
, where i ∈ N\{0} and k = 1, 2, ... .
Then, a cps µki ∈ ∆H
(
Xk−1−i
)
is called a k-order cps or simply a k-order belief. For k > 1,
µki is a joint cps on the opponents’ strategies and (k − 1)-order cps ’, i.e.:
µ1i ∈ ∆H
(
X0−i
)
where X0−i = A−i,
µ2i ∈ ∆H
(
X1−i
)
where X1−i = A−i ×∆H (A−j) ,
µ3i ∈ ∆H
(
X2−i
)
where X2−i = A−i ×∆H (A−j)×∆H
(A−j ×∆H (A−i)) etc. .
This brings us to the formal definition of hierarchies of cps ’:4
Definition 2 A hierarchy of cps is a countably infinite sequence of cps’:
µi =
(
µ1i , µ
2
i , ...
) ∈∏
k>0
∆H
(
Xk−1−i
)
.
4See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), p. 11.
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As one can see, each piece of information appears many times in the belief hierarchy
of player i. This implies that one can calculate marginal beliefs of higher-order beliefs.
As also Geanakoplos et al. (1989) point out, these marginal beliefs of higher-order beliefs
should coincide with lower-order beliefs in the belief hierarchy for the hierarchy to be
meaningful. In other words beliefs should be coherent. We say a hierarchy of cps ’ is
coherent if the cps ’ of distinct orders assign the same conditional probabilities to lower-
order events. This means,
µki (·|h) = margXk−1−i µ
k+1
i (·|h) (k = 1, 2, ...;h ∈ H),
where margXk−1−i
µk+1i (·|h) is the event of order k− 1 in the cps of order k+ 1, µk+1i (·|h).
If this condition holds, player i is said to have a coherent conditional belief system. It can
be shown that a coherent hierarchy of cps’ induces a single cps νi on the cross product
of A−i and the sets of hierarchies of cps ’ of i’s opponents −i. Note, however, coherency
regarding the own beliefs does not exclude the possibility that the cps νi puts a positive
probability on the opponents incoherence. But as players are rational they should not
believe that their opponents entertain incoherent beliefs. Hence, in order to rule this
out, say that a coherent hierarchy µi satisfies belief in coherency of order 1 if the induced
cps νi is such that each νi (·|h) with h ∈ H assigns probability one to the opponents’
coherence of order 1. The hierarchy of coherent beliefs µi satisfies belief in coherency of
order k, if it satisfies belief in coherency of order k − 1, µi is collectively coherent, if it
satisfies belief in coherency of order k for each positive integer k.5 We denote the set
of collectively coherent hierarchies of beliefs of player i by Mi. The set of collectively
coherent beliefs of the opponents −i is M−i and M =
∏
j∈N\{0}Mj.
As the probability distributions associated with the moves of the player chance, i.e.
player 0, are commonly known, nobody faces any uncertainty with regard to his true
strategy ω. Players do not learn the true strategy of player 0 over the course of the game
since it is common knowledge from the beginning anyhow.
Finally, belief-dependent utilities are defined as:
Definition 3 A belief dependent utility u of player i ∈ N\{0} is a function:
ui : Z × {ω} ×Mi × Πj 6=i (Aj ×Mj)→ <,
where i, j ∈ N\{0}.
Hence, as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), the utility of any player i depends on
the end-node, Z, the hierarchy of conditional beliefs of player i and the hierarchies of
conditional beliefs of all other players j 6= i. In addition to this, however, we also assume
that player i’s utility depends on the verifiable behavioral strategy of the player chance,
5See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
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ω. The reason for this is the following: Different to the strategies of all players j 6= i,
the strategy of the player chance is not slowly unraveled in the course of the game, i.e.
it is not ‘learned’. It is commonly known and it is known that it is commonly known.
Hence, players do not update their beliefs concerning the moves of chance. Given this,
we assume that players’ utilities do not depend on the hierarchy of conditional beliefs of
player 0, but simply on his verifiable strategy ω.
As also argued in the introduction, allowing for moves of chance and assuming that
players’ utilities depend on the verifiable behavioral strategy of the player 0 allows (i) to
capture the behavioral evidence on procedural concerns and (ii) to analyze the impact
of procedural choices on the strategic interaction of agents that are motivated by belief-
dependent preferences. As also exemplified in our introductory principal-agent story,
procedures can be viewed as possibly stochastic decision mechanisms determining the
ex-ante probabilities for situations in which agents can find themselves in ex-post. Re-
member, in our principal-agent setting there are basically two types of decision-making
procedures that the principal can use to take his decision. On the one hand, the principal
can decide himself using strategies (i) and (ii) which both put probability 1 on one of the
agents. On the other hand, he can use a decision making procedure giving each agent a
verifiable chance of 50% to get either job by using strategy (iii). This exemplifies, how
decision-making procedures can be conceptualize by allowing for moves of chance. Or in
other words, by allowing for moves of chance we can formalize strategic envirmonments in
which people have the possibility to choose between different decision making procedures.
How do these procedural choices impact strategic interactions? As already argued
in the introduction, if people are consequentialists, their behavior is independent of the
decision-making procedures involved. This is at odds with the behavioral evidence from
psychological and economic research. The persistent evidence on procedural concerns
can be rationalized, however, assuming that agents have belief-dependent preferences
as formalized in the general framework in this section. To get an intuition for how our
framework explains the empirical evidence on procedural concerns, consider the following
example: Assume the principal in our principal-agent setting is guilt averse a´ la Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2007). Note, guilt aversion a´ la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) is
one type of belief-dependent emotion that is in line with definition 3. In the context of
our principal-agent example this means, the principal is averse to not living up to his
belief about the agents’ expectations about his decision. More formally, the principal is
assumed to have the following utility function:
up = xp + Πj 6=pGpa · (xa − Epa[xa]) (1)
where xp and xa respectively are the material payoffs of the principal and the agent,
Gpa is an exogenous constant defining the principal’s sensitivity to guilt towards agent
a and Epa[xa] is the principal’s belief about the agent’s payoff expectation.
6 Hence,
6For a more detailed description of guilt aversion see Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)
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the principal’s reduction of utility from his feeling of guilt towards agent a is given by
Gpa·(xa−Epa[xa]). As one can easily see, the principal feels guilt, i.e. Gpa·(xa−Epa[xa]) <
0, if he does not live up to the expectations of the agent, i.e. xa < Epa[xa].
Assume now, the principal believes the agents believe that he will use the impartial
random appointment procedure which gives both of them an equal chance to get the
higher and the lower paid job. More precisely, the principal believes that the agents’
expectation about their payoff is
0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt,
where 0.5 is the chance associated to the random appointment procedure and wc and wt
are respectively the wages associated with the higher and the lower paying job. Given
this, the principal’s guilt associated with each type of decision-making procedure that he
can use to take his decision can be described as follows. First, if the principal, given his
beliefs, chooses to decide himself, his guilt towards the typist would be equal to
Gpt · (wt − [0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt]) = Gpt · (−0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt).
As wc > wt, Gpt · (−0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt) < 0, i.e. guilt would reduce his utility. Second, if
he decides to take the random decision-making procedure and the same agent becomes
typist, his feeling of guilt towards him is:
Gpt · ([0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt]− [0.5 · wc + 0.5 · wt]) = 0.
The principal’s feeling of guilt would be 0 following the random decision-making proce-
dure as he would life up to his belief about the agents’ expectations.
Depending on the decision-making procedure that the principal uses to take his ap-
pointment decision, he feels more or less guilt. Quite intuitively, the different levels of
guilt associated with the different decision-making procedures might influence the prin-
cipal’s procedural choice. In other words, the principal is concerned about the procedure
used as it influences his feeling of guilt towards the agents. Obviously guilt aversion, is
just one example of a belief-dependent motivation. However, this example shows how
moves of chance can be used to formalize procedures and how the stochastic character
underlying these decision-making procedures influences the evaluation of guilt.
Our general formulation in equation 3 allows for all kinds of belief-dependent prefer-
ences (e.g. reciprocity, disappointment, regret). More technically, our class of extensive
form games basically represents an extension of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s class
of extensive form games with belief-dependent preferences allowing for moves of chance.
This means our framework with moves of chance allows for the analysis of procedu-
ral concerns in strategic interactions in which agents have all kinds of belief-dependent
psychological motivations.
In the next section we present a solution concept which can be used to derive predic-
tions regarding the strategic interaction of agents that are motivated by belief-dependent
preferences in situations in which outcomes also depend on moves of chance.
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3 Sequential Equilibria
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) adapt Kreps and Wilson (1982)’s concept of sequential
equilibrium to their class of dynamic psychological games. They do so by characterizing
consistent assessments that do not only consist of first-, but also of higher-order beliefs
and defining sequential equilibria as sequentially rational consistent assessments.
As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), also our equilibrium concept refers to mixed
strategies, i.e. implicit randomizations over sets of procedures. Note, however, that,
following Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), we interpret player i’s mixed strategy as
a conjecture on the part of his opponents as to what player i will do. Hence, denote a
behavioral strategy of player i as σi = (σi,h)h∈Hi ∈ Σi, where Σi is the set of all mixed
strategies of player i. The behavioral choice σi,h ∈ Σi(h) in h has to be understood as an
implicit randomization over the set of actions Ai (h) in history h and interpreted as an ar-
ray of common conditional first-order beliefs held by i’s opponents.7 This means that the
behavioral strategy σi is part of an assessment ((σ, ρ0), (µ, ρ0)) = ((σi, ω), (µi, ω))i∈N\{0}
of behavioral strategies and hierarchies of conditional beliefs.
Three conditions ensure consistency of assessments in the original characterization by
Kreps and Wilson (1982):
1. Beliefs must be derived using Bayes’ rule,
2. Beliefs must reflect that players choose their strategies independently,
3. Players with identical information have identical beliefs.
In addition to these conditions, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) add another re-
quirement for consistency:
4. Players hold correct beliefs about each others’ beliefs.
Condition 1 holds by the definition of hierarchies of conditional belief systems (Defi-
nition 1). In other words, hierarchies of beliefs are defined in such a way that conditional
beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule. In order to formalize conditions 2-4 we first need to
define what is meant by stochastic independence. Note, the observability of past actions
allows us to define stochastic independence of the conditional belief systems in terms of
marginal cps ’. Different to the concept of marginal beliefs used in the previous section,
a marginal cps here refers to player i’s marginal belief on the strategies of a particular
player j and it is denoted as µ1ij ∈ ∆H (Aj), where ∆H (Aj) is the set of marginal cps
on the strategies of player j. Given this we can define stochastic independence of beliefs
as:8
7See Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
8See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s definition of stochastic independence
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Definition 4 A first-order cps µ1i ∈ ∆H (A−i) satisfies stochastic independence, if there
exists a profile of marginal cps’ (µ1ij)j 6=i ∈
∏
j 6=i ∆
H (Aj) such that
µ1i (A−i|h) =
∏
j 6=i
µ1ij(Aj|h)
for all h ∈ Hi. We denote the set of stochastically independent first-order cps’ of a player
i as ∆HI (A−i).
This brings us to our definition of consistent assessments:
Definition 5 An assessment ((σ, ω), (µ, ω)) is consistent if:
1. The first-order cps of each player satisfies stochastic independence as formalized in
Definition (4), i.e.:
∀i ∈ N\{0} , µ1i ∈ ∆HI (A−i) .
2. The marginal first-order cps of any two players about any third player coincide,
i.e.:
∀i ∈ N\{0} ,∀l ∈ N\{i, j, 0} ,∀h ∈ H, µ1il(·|h) = µ1jl(·|h).
3. Each players higher order beliefs in µ assign probability 1 to the lower order beliefs
in µ itself:
∀i ∈ N\{0} ,∀k > 1,∀h ∈ H, µki (·|h) = µk−1i (·|h)× δµk−1−i ,
where δµk−1−i
is the probability measure which assigns probability 1 to µk−1−i .
Conditions 1 and 2 capture the assumption that beliefs should be the end-product of
a transparent reasoning process of intelligent people [Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)].
Condition 3, on the other hand, is analog to Geanakoplos et al. (1989)’s condition
requiring that players hold common and correct beliefs about each others’ beliefs.
After having defined consistent assessments we can formally characterize sequential
psychological equilibria (henceforth: SPE) by requiring sequential rationality:
Definition 6 An assessment ((σ, ω), (µ, ω)) is a sequential psychological equilibrium (SPE),
if for all i ∈ N\{0} , h ∈ Hi it holds:
Supp (σi,h) ⊆ argmaxAi,h∈A(h)Eµ,ω [ui|h,Ai,h] ,
where Eµ,ω [ui|h,Ai,h] is the expected utility of player i conditional on history h, choice
Ai,h ∈ A (h) and given the system of hierarchies of conditional beliefs µ and the commonly
known strategy, ω, played by player 0.
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Note, the expected utility of any player i ∈ N\{0} (conditional on history h, choice
Ai,h ∈ A (h), given the system of consistent hierarchies of conditional beliefs µ and the
commonly known strategy, ω) can be defined as:
Eµ,ω [ui|h,Ai,h] =
∑
a0∈A0(h)
ω (a0|h)
∑
A−i∈A−i(h)
µ1i (A−i|h)∑
Ai∈Ai(h,Ai,h)
µ1ji (Ai| (h,Ai,h,A−i,h))ui (ζ (Ai,A−i, a0) , ω, µ,A−i) ,
where ζ (Ai,A−i, a0) ∈ Z denotes the terminal history induced by the strategies Ai and
A−i, and the strategy a0 of player 0. Note, this specification is different from the expected
utility formula traditionally used. Furthermore, it is also different from the specification
used by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) as it encloses the behavioral moves of the
player chance.
The following proposition shows that there exists at least one sequential psychological
equilibrium in any game with psychological incentives and continuous utility functions:
Proposition 1 If the utility functions are continuous, there exists at least one sequential
psychological equilibrium assessment.
Proof: Consider a game with psychological incentives in which any action at any
history is played with a strictly positive minimal probability ε. More formally, consider
an ε-perturbed game Γε in which players i ∈ N\{0} dispose of ‘constrained’ choice sets
Σεi (h) at each history h ∈ Hi. The ‘constrained’ choice set Σεi (h) of player i in history h
is defined as:
Σεi (h) := {τi,h ∈ Σi(h)|τi,h(Ai,h) ≥ ε, ∀Ai,h ∈ Ai(h)}.
So Σεi (h) consists of only those elements in Σi(h) that put a strictly positive probability
greater or equal to ε on all elements Ai,h ∈ Ai(h), i.e. Σεi (h) ⊂ Σi(h). It follows
that in any Γε the set of strictly mixed procedural strategies of players i ∈ N\{0}
is Σεi = ×h∈HiΣiε(h) and the set of all strictly positive behavioral strategy profiles is
Σε := ×i∈N\{0}Σεi . Note, for each σ ∈ Σε there exists a unique corresponding profile of
hierarchies of cps ’ µ = β(σ) such that ((σ, ω), (β(σ), ω)) is consistent.
Now, define for σ ∈ Σε, ε > 0, i ∈ N\{0} and h ∈ Hi the local best-response of
player i in history h as:
BRεi,h(σ) := {τˆi,h ∈ Σεi (h)|ui(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i, ω) ≥ ui(σi/τi,h, σ−i, ω), ∀τi,h ∈ Σεi (h)},
where σi/τi,h denotes the behavioral strategy for player i that specifies the strictly positive
mixture τi,h at history h ∈ Hi and σi at every other history controlled by player i. In
other words, local best-response-correspondences are strictly mixed behavioral choices
that put at least a minimum probability ε on each procedure Ai,h ∈ Ai(h) given i’s
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choices in all other histories controlled by him and given the behavioral strategy of
the opponents. The domain of the local best-response-correspondence is Σε. The set
Σε = Σε1×Σε2...×ΣεN and each Σεi with i ∈ N\{0} is defined as Σεi = ×h∈HΣεi (h). As said
above, Σεi (h) is the set of all behavioral strategies of player i at history h that put at least
a strictly positive probability ε on each action Ai,h ∈ Ai(h). It is non-empty (because
Ai(h) is non-empty), compact and convex. Hence, also Σε is non-empty, compact and
convex (because the finite Cartesian product of nonempty, convex and compact sets is
itself nonempty, convex and compact). Furthermore, BRεi,h(σ) is upper-semi-continuous.
Note, the local best-response-correspondence BRεi,h(σ) is upper-semi-continuous, if for
any sequence (σi/τˆ
m
i,h, σ
m
−i) → (σi/τˆi,h, σ−i) such that σi/τˆmi,h ∈ BRεi,h(σi/τˆmi,h, σm−i) for all
m ∈ {1, 2, ...}, we have σi/τˆi,h ∈ BRεi,h(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i). To see that this is indeed the case,
note that for all m, the u(σi/τˆ
m
i,h, σ
m
−i) ≥ u(σi/τˆ ′i,h, σm−i) for all σi/τˆ ′i,h ∈ Σεi . Hence, by the
continuity of the utility function, we have u(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i) ≥ u(σi/τˆ ′i,h, σ−i).
Given the local best-response correspondence BRεi,h(σ), the best-response correspon-
dence BRε(σ) is defined as:
BRε = (τˆi,h)h∈Hi∧i∈N{0} .
This implies that also BRε : Σε → Σε is upper semi continues, compact and convex and,
hence, has a fixed point σˆε. As already pointed out by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), the
profile σˆε constitutes an equilibrium of the constrained game Γε.
Now, let εk be a sequence converging to 0 and σˆk the corresponding sequence of
equilibrium assessments with σˆk being an equilibrium of Γε
k
. By the compactness of
Σ, σˆk has an accumulation point σ∗ and by the upper-semi-continuity of the local best-
response-correspondents, BRεh(σ), σ
∗
i,h assigns positive probability only to those actions
that are best responses to (σ∗, β(σ∗), ω) at h. Therefore ((σ∗, ω), (β(σ∗), ω)) is a sequential
equilibrium assessment. This concludes the proof. 
In this section we have formally defined sequential psychological equilibria in the con-
text of our class of games with psychological payoffs and moves of chance. Furthermore
we have shown that every game with psychological incentives and continuous utility func-
tions has at least one SPE. Using this solution concept we demonstrate in the following
section the impact of procedural choices on the interaction of psychologically motivated
agents in the principal-agent context.
4 The Impact of Appointment Procedures
In this section we formalize the principal-agent example already sketched in the introduc-
tion and analyze the potential impact of the appointment procedure on the performance
of the typists using the sequential equilibrium concept defined in the previous section.
Consider a two-stage game with a principal and two agents. In the first stage, the princi-
pal chooses the procedure by which the typist is chosen. The principal has three different
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strategies: He can directly appoint agent i (strategy di); he can directly appoint the
other agent j (strategy dj); he can choose a random appointment procedure (strategy r),
where chance determines the typist with equal probabilities for both agents.
After the tasks are allocated, the appointed typist determines his effort e in the
second stage. The minimum and the maximum effort levels are denoted by emin and
emax, respectively, with emin ≥ 0. Associated with effort are effort costs c(e) ≥ 0. In
order to analyze the detrimental effect of the appointment procedure on the typist’s
effort choice, and in accordance with the empirical results shown in the next section, we
assume that the typists will provide at least some effort voluntarily. This means that
effort costs are minimized at some e˜ with emin < e˜ < emax. The effort cost function is
twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex. In order to avoid corner solutions
we assume that c′(emin) = −∞ and c′(emax) =∞.
As already pointed out in the introduction, we are interested in the impact of the
appointment procedure on the effort of the typist. Hence, we do not model any effort
choice of the controller. The profit of the principal is given by
pip = e− wc − wt,
where wc and wt denote the wages of the controller and the typist. Different to the
example in section 2, assume the principal is not motivated by any fairness or reciprocity
considerations. He is a pure profit maximizer.
As already mentioned, we assume the controller does not provide any effort. Hence, his
direct ‘material’ payoff is wc. This payoff is of course not relevant for any decision of the
controller, since the controller has no decision to make. But as we will see it is important
when the typist has to evaluate the decision made by the principal. Consequently, it
influences the typist’s effort choice.
The typist gets a lower wage than the controller, i.e. wt < wc. We assume that the
wage difference is larger than the largest possible effort cost difference, i.e. wc − wt >
maxe (c(e)− c(e˜)).
Agent i becomes a typist and has to choose his effort level whenever either the prin-
cipal has chosen di, or the principal has chosen r and chance has appointed i as typist.
Denote by ei(s), s ∈ {di, r}, the effort choice of agent i if the principal chooses s, and if
chance appoints i in case of r. Disregarding any psychological payoff, agent i′s expected
direct, ‘material’ payoff is given by
pii(s, ei(s)) = wt − c(ei(s))
with s ∈ {di, r}, and with nature appointing i in case of r.9 But we assume that agents
do not only care about their material payoffs, but are also motivated by belief-dependent
psychological payoffs.
9During the whole analysis, we assume that the agents cannot quit the job. This is equivalent to
assuming that the outside payoff is sufficiently small.
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In order to get testable predictions, one has to further specify the type of belief-
dependent psychological payoff. The specification we use captures e.g. reciprocity as
modeled by Rabin (1992) and by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).10
To model these types of psychological payoffs, first- and second-order beliefs have to
enter the utility functions. Denote by ei(s) the second-order belief of agent i about the
principal’s belief about agent i′’s effort choice when the principal chooses s, s ∈ {di, r},
and when chance appoints i in case of r. Denote by pii(s, ei(s)) the belief of agent i about
the material payoff the principal intended for i when i finds himself in a situation where
he has to make an effort choice, i.e. when the principal chooses s ∈ {di, r}, and chance
appoints i in case of r. Note that the equilibrium requires that the first-order belief of the
agent about the principal’s choice is equal to the actual choice of the principal. Therefore,
in this simple game we do not have to distinguish notationally between the agent’s first-
order belief about the principal’s choice and the actual choice of the principal. Note
further, as specified in section 2, the agent does not hold the principal responsible for
the choice of the moves of chance. Hence, pii(s, ei(s)) is given by
pii(s, ei(s)) =
{
1
2
wc +
1
2
(wt − c(ei(r)) if s = r
wt − c(ei(di)) if s = di.
Since wc − wt > maxe (c(e)− c(e˜)), pii(r, ei(r)) > pii(di, ei(di) for any ei(r), ei(di).
Denote by pip the principals material payoff agent i intend to give him whenever either
the principal has chosen di, or the principal has chosen r and chance has appointed i as
typist. pip is given by
pip(s, ei(s)) =
{
ei(r)− wc − wt if s = r and chance has chosen i
ei(di)− wc − wt if s = di
In accordance with the literature we assume that agents’ overall payoff is quasilinear
in the own material payoff and in a psychological term depending on pip and on pii. If
agent i finds himself in a situation where he is the typist, his utility is given by
ui(s, ei(s), ei(s)) = wt − c(ei(s)) + vi(pip(s, ei(s)), pii(s, ei(s)))
for s ∈ {di, r}, and in case of r chance appoints i. We assume that vi is twice dif-
ferentiable, that the partial derivatives of vi with respect to pip and pii are finite, and
that
∂2vi
∂pip∂pii
> 0. (2)
∂2vi
∂pi2p
≤ 0
10Note, on could also assume that agents are motivated by other emotions like guilt a´ la Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2007) or dissapointment a´ la Ruﬄe (1999). However, it can be shown that for such
emotions multiple SPE exist. Hence, these models would not provide us with testable predictions.
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This assumption captures the essence of fairness and reciprocity considerations. It
states that the marginal utility derived from the material payoff the agent intends to give
to the principal increases in the material payoff the agent thinks that the principal wants
to give to him. Furthermore, the marginal utility derived from the payoff intended to be
given to the principal does not increase in the principal’s intended payoff. As said above
and as can be easily checked, the reciprocity theories of Rabin (1992) and Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) fulfill this assumption.
Using this type of psychological motivation, we get the following result:
Proposition 2 In any sequential psychological equilibrium, e(r) > e(di).
Proof: When agent i has to make an effort choice, he maximizes his utility for given
s and given pii. Formally, for s ∈ {di, r} the maximization problems read
max
ei(s)∈[emin,emax]
wt − c(ei(s)) + vi(pip(s, ei(s), pii(s, ei(s)))
Since ∂pip(s,ei(di))
∂ei(di)
= ∂pip(s,ei(r))
∂ei(r)
= 1 the first order conditions are given by
− c′(ei(di)) + ∂vi(pip(s, ei(di), pii(s, ei(di)))
∂pip
= 0 (3)
and
− c′(ei(r)) + ∂vi(pip(s, ei(r), pii(s, ei(r)))
∂pip
= 0. (4)
Since c(emax) = −c(emin) =∞, the maximization problem has only interior solutions for
any s ∈ {di, r}, and the optimal effort choices have to fulfill these FOC’s.
Now assume that contrary to the proposition, there exists an equilibrium with e(r) ≤
e(di). Because of strict convexity of the effort cost function, this implies that −c′(ei(r)) ≥
−c′(ei(di)). Because of the first order conditions, we get
∂vi(pip(s, ei(r), pii(s, ei(r)))
∂pip
≤ ∂vi(pip(s, ei(di), pii(s, ei(di)))
∂pip
(5)
Recall that pii(s, ei(r)) > pii(s, ei(di)) for any ei(r), ei(di). Together with 2), 5) implies
pip(s, ei(di)) < pip(s, ei(r)).
But this condition only holds for ei(di) < ei(r) - a contradiction.
We have shown that whenever the agents have belief-dependent preferences as de-
fined above and thus care about the principal’s choice of procedure, the typist picked
by a random mechanism should work harder than the one directly appointed. The in-
tuition behind that result is straightforward: If picked by the random mechanism and
not on purpose, the agent attributes ‘better’ intentions to the principal’s choice (i.e.
pii(s, ei(r)) > pii(s, ei(di)), and is therefore willing to work harder. He does not hold the
principal responsible for being typist, it is just bad luck.
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5 The field experiment
5.1 Setup
To test our result in proposition 2, i.e. the impact of the principal’s procedural choice
on the effort choice of the disadvantaged agent, we conducted a field experiment at the
University of Namur. We hired research assistants (RAs) for an ongoing research project
that involves constructing a large dataset on the evolution of family structures in XIX-
XXth century Russia and Kazakhstan. Half of the research assistants (the ‘typists’)
had to type numerical data into a Microsoft Excel worksheet from photocopies of old
statistical publications of the Russian Empire. The others (the ‘controllers’) had to
check whether the data typed in was correct. All RAs were employed for two hours. The
typists received a flat hourly wage of e10, whereas the controllers received a flat hourly
wage of e15. There is no obvious difference in terms of intrinsic (dis)utility of labor for
both jobs. If anything, the controllers’s task seems to be less unpleasant. Taking the
wage difference into account, the typist’s job is for sure less attractive than that of the
controller.
As also laid out in section 4, to test for procedural concerns, we concentrate in our
experiment on the performance of the typists who are disadvantaged compared to the
controllers. If procedural concerns play no role, the performance of typists (in terms
of the amount of data typed in and of typos made) should be independent of the way
they are appointed. We used two different mechanisms to appoint the typists and the
controllers: a direct and a random appointment mechanism. In the treatment with the
‘direct appointment procedure’, we directly appointed RAs to typist and controller roles
(without giving any justification for the appointment to a given role). In the treatment
with the ‘random appointment procedure’, each RA drew a card from a bowl to determine
her/his role. There were equally many typist and controller cards in the bowl giving each
RA an equal chance to become typist or controller.
Under both procedures, half of RAs were appointed as typists and the other half as
controllers. All RAs were made aware of the wage difference, as well as of the fact that
one-half of them were controllers and the other half were typists (see the instructions in
the Appendix). Note, however, that none of the participants was made aware of the fact
that this was not only a real RAs’ job but also an experiment.
We hired freshmen and sophomore undergraduate students of the University of Namur
studying in six different faculties (Economics, Law, Science, Computer Science, Philoso-
phy, and Medicine) as RAs. For each RA, we know which faculty and year s/he studies
in, whether the student is foreign-born, and his or her gender. Note that, as some regis-
tered students did not show up on the date of experiment, the numbers of RAs subject
to the two appointment procedures differs slightly.
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5.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the distribution of typists across treatments and gender. Overall, there
were 43 typists: 24 appointed directly and 19 appointed through the random appointment
procedure. 25 subjects were men and 19 were women. The number of male subjects in
two treatments was roughly equal (13 under direct appointment and 12 under random
appointment), whereas for women there was a slight over-representation in the direct-
appointment treatment (11 versus 7 under random appointment).
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our three measures of performance. On
average, in two hours of work, a typist encoded 3675 cells in the Excel worksheet. How-
ever, there is substantial variation in the number of cells typed in: standard deviation
is 1031 cells, with the minimum equal to barely over 2000 cells and the maximum over
6800 cells.
[Insert Table 2 here]
We also measured the number of cells typed in incorrectly (‘typos’), using the typos
detected by controllers, which were also cross-checked by other research assistants. On
average, a typist made 6.74 typos in two hours. Again, the performance varied substan-
tially: standard deviation was 5.42 typos, with some typists making 0 mistakes, while
some making as many as 20 typos.
Clearly, a typist typing in more data was also likely to make more typos. To account
for this, we also measure the error rate. This is a common measure of performance in
statistical quality control (Montgomery 2008). On average, a typist typed in 0.19% of
cells incorrectly. This error rate might look small, but actually a large part of the cells
had to be filled by zeros. In these cases no effort was required to avoid an error. So
the error rates for the ”effort demanding” cells were actually much larger. Furthermore,
there was still large variation in the error rate: standard deviation is 0.16%, with the
minimum error rate equal to 0 and the maximum error rate of 0.6%.
5.3 Experimental results
Tables 3-5 present our experimental results.
[Insert Tables 3-5 here]
As one can see from Table 3, an average typist inserted 3470 cells under the ‘direct
appointment’ procedure and an average typist inserted 3934 cells under ‘random appoint-
ment’ procedure. Men typed in 3892 cells on average, while women typed in 3375 cells
on average.
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However, the results across treatments were strikingly different for men and women.
Women inserted on average 3444 cells under ‘direct appointment’ and a somewhat lower
number of cells - 3267 - under ‘random appointment’. Men, on the contrary, inserted
substantially more cells under ‘random appointment’ (4324, on average) than under ‘di-
rect appointment’ (3494, on average). Thus, in terms of the number of cells typed in,
there was an important effect of procedures on the performance of male typists, with
‘random appointment’ procedure inducing higher performance, while for female typists
the effect was weak and in the opposite direction.
Table 4 presents the results on the number of typos made. Here, the results are
similar for both men and women. Male (female) typists appointed using the random
appointment procedure made fewer typos (4.8 and 4.6, respectively) as compared to
those chosen using ‘direct appointment’ (9.3 and 7.2, respectively). The effect when
both genders are considered is 4.7 typos on average under ‘random appointment’ versus
8.3 typos under ‘direct appointment’.
Finally, the quality control results are presented in Table 5. They are similar to those
on the number of typos. On average, typists hired under the ‘random appointment’ pro-
cedure worked with an error rate of 0.12%, while those hired under ‘direct appointment’
had an error rate twice as high, namely 0.24%. For men, the corresponding error rates
were 0.11% versus 0.26%, and for women they were 0.14% versus 0.23%.
5.4 Regression results
We now proceed to more rigorous statistical analysis. We estimate the following econo-
metric model:
yi = α + βIi(r = 1) + γXi + εi, (6)
where yi is the measure of individual performance of typist i, Ii(r = 1) is the indica-
tor variable that takes value 1 if the typist is chosen under the ‘random appointment’
procedure and 0 if she/he is appointed under ‘direct appointment”, Xi is the vector of
individual characteristics that might capture a part of the variation in the performance,
and εi is the error term that we assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and
a constant variance.
Our theoretical model predicts that the coefficient β is positive and significantly dif-
ferent from zero in the statistical sense. In other words, finding a positive and statistically
significant β would mean that once we hold other observable individual characteristics
constant, individuals in the ’random appointment’ procedure exhibit higher performance
than in the ’direct appointment’ procedure.
Moreover, given that the above results suggest that typists of different gender might
respond differently to the same procedure, we will also estimate the following altered
model:
yi = α + βIi(r = 1) + δGi(f = 1) + µ[Ii(r = 1) ∗Gi(f = 1)] + γXi + εi, (7)
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where Gi(f = 1) is the indicator variable for gender (which takes value 1 is the typist is
a woman and 0 otherwise). The differential-by-gender response to the ‘random appoint-
ment’ procedure is thus captured by the coefficient µ. Thus, finding a positive (negative)
and statistically significant µ would mean that once we hold all other observable indi-
vidual characteristics constant, women in the ’random appointment’ procedure exhibit
higher (lower) performance than in the ’direct appointment’ procedure.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of models (6) and (7).
[Insert Table 6 here]
Columns (1)-(3) show results with the number of cells inserted as the measure of
individual performance. Column (1) reports the results of the estimation with only the
treatment as a regressor. On average, typists appointed using ‘random appointment’
encode 464 cells more as compared to those chosen by ‘direct appointment’, but this
difference is not statistically significant. The results become much more clear-cut when
we add the gender of the typist and allow for the differential-by-gender response to the
treatment. Column (2) reports the results of the estimation of the amended model (7),
without additional controls. A typist hired under ‘random appointment’ inserts 830
cells more as compared to those hired under ‘direct appointment’, and this difference is
significant at 5%. However, if the typist is a woman, under ‘random appointment’ she
inserts 226 cells less (830− 50− 1006 = −226) than under ‘direct appointment’. Clearly,
there is substantial variation in individual performance, a part of which is captured when
we add the additional controls that might be correlated with unobservable skills: faculty
and freshmen dummies (people sort into faculties and there is probably some acquisition
of skill over time) and the foreign-born dummy (a student whose mother tongue is not
French might take more time to understand the instructions, which might reduce his/her
performance). Column (3) presents the results of the estimation of the model (7) with
these additional regressors. The coefficients β and µ both increase in absolute value
and are more precisely estimated (both are significant at 1%). Moreover, the adjusted-
R2 of the model is the highest among the three estimations. Thus, a male typist under
‘random appointment’ encodes 1327 cells more than under the ‘direct appointment’. This
is a quantitatively large effect, about 1.3 times the standard deviation. The effect of the
‘random appointment’ for a women is, however, small and negative: 1327 + 341−1970 =
−302.
Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) present the results of the estimation with the number
of typos and the error rate as the measure of performance. In both cases, the effect of
the appointment procedure is clear and similar for both male and female typists (the
coefficient µ is not significantly different from zero in any estimation). The results are
similar across all the estimations. Using the model with the best fit (as measured by
the adjusted-R2), we can state that a typist appointed using the ‘random appointment’
procedure makes 3.6 typos less (and has an error rate of 0.12% lower) than if the ‘direct
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appointment’ procedure is used. This effect is quantitively large: it equals 2/3 of the
standard deviation in the case of typos and 3/4 in the case of the error rate.
Summarizing, in line with proposition 2 our experimental results suggest that the
appointment procedure has significant and large effects on individual performance. How-
ever, the form of the effect differs for men and women. If hired under ‘random appoint-
ment’, men exhibit higher performance by all counts: both in terms of quantity and
quality of output. Instead, women - if hired under ‘random appointment’ - increase the
quality of their output but not the quantity.
These findings provide clear support for our theoretical hypotheses. They indicate
that in the field-experimental setting procedures matter for individual performance: re-
search assistants working in a natural environment and unaware of participating in an
experiment exhibit substantial differences in terms of quality and quantity of effort that
they exert, depending on the way we - the experimenters - have chosen to assign them
the worse task.
Moreover, our findings in terms of gender differentials in effort (in quantity, but not
quality of effort) complements the existing literature on the gender differences in social
preferences. Croson and Gneezy (2009, section 3) argue, based on their interpretation
of a large body of the experimental literature that women seem to be more sensitive
to the experimental context. Our results qualify this argument: in the principal-agent
field-experimental setting, both women and men seem to exert less effort if the procedure
chosen by the principal is considered less fair; however, women carry out this reduction
of effort in a subtler way than men. Women do not reduce the quantity of output, but
reduce its quality, while men reduce their effort more explicitly, i.e. both the quantity
and quality.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how decision-making procedures can be integrated into
the framework of dynamic psychological games by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) by
allowing for moves of chance. After proving the existence of sequential psychological
equilibria within this extended framework, we investigated the impact of procedural
concerns in the context of a specific principal-agent relation. Our model predicted that
whenever agents have belief-dependent preferences, the principal’s choice of appointment
mechanism is crucial for the elicited effort. We then tested this hypothesis in a field
experiment, and its results confirm our predictions. Moreover, we find interesting gender
differences in the form of the reaction to different procedures.
While our paper provides a general framework for procedural concerns, the applica-
tion to the principal-agent context as well as its experimental test concentrate on specific
belief-dependent preferences. These specific belief-dependent preferences (which encom-
pass, for instance, reciprocity) are used to come up with testable predictions concerning
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the impact of procedural choices on the effort provision of agents in our principal-agent
setting. However, as we have discussed, procedural concerns are not confined to these
specific belief-dependent motivations but also arise under other psychological incentives
(guilt, disappointment, etc.). The specific analyses of the impact of procedural choices
on the interaction of agents with these other types of belief-dependent motivations is left
for future research.
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8 Appendix
APPENDIX 
 
The following information was read out to subjects at the beginning of each session. The 
contents were identical in both treatments, except the section marked in italics. 
 
 
Job description and payment details 
 
We are constructing a dataset on the socio-economic characteristics of extended families 
and their production and consumption decisions, for a project on the evolution of family 
structure and collective action in traditional societies. The raw data that we have (that 
comes from an agricultural census of the Russian Empire of the beginning of the 20th 
century) exists only in the paper version, and not in electronic format. This means that it 
is necessary to copy it from the paper version into an Excel worksheet.  
 
[Detailed instructions on how to copy the data from the paper version into the worksheet] 
 
To make sure that the data is inserted correctly, all the files will be crosschecked. This 
means that there are two different tasks. TYPISTS insert data into Excel worksheets. 
CONTROLLERS verify the inserted data and correct it wherever necessary.  
 
The hourly wage is 15€ for a controller and 10€ for a typist. In total, you are going to 
work for 2 hours; thus, a typist will receive 20€ and a controller 30€ at the end of the 
work. 
 
[TREATMENT 1] Given the lack of time, we cannot verify which of you are better 
qualified to work as a typist or as a controller. We thus have decided that you are going 
to work as a TYPIST. 
 
[TREATMENT 2] Given that we do not know which of you are better qualified to work as 
a typist or as a controller, the tasks are allocated in a random fashion. Each of you had 
to draw a card from the bowl. If you have picked a card with the word “TYPIST”, you 
are going to work as a typist. If you have picked a card with the word “CONTROLLER”, 
you are going to work as a controller. 
 
In order to avoid losing the data inserted, please make sure that you save your Excel file 
regularly.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
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Table 1. Number of observations
Male Female Both
Direct appointment 13 11 24
Random appointment 12 7 19
Both treatments 25 18 43
Table 2. Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of cells encoded 3675 1031 2010 6825
Number of typos made 6.74 5.42 0 20
Error rate, in % 0.19 0.16 0 0.6
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Table 3. Average number of cells encoded
Male Female Both
Direct appointment 3494 3444 3470
Random appointment 4324 3267 3934
Both treatments 3892 3375 3675
Table 4. Average number of typos made
Male Female Both
Direct appointment 9.3 7.2 8.3
Random appointment 4.8 4.6 4.7
Both treatments 7.2 6.2 6.7
Table 5. Average error rate, in %
Male Female Both
Direct appointment 0.26 0.23 0.24
Random appointment 0.11 0.14 0.12
Both treatments 0.18 0.19 0.19
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